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Bankruptcy’s Role in the COVID-19 Crisis 
 
Edward R. Morrison and Andrea C. Saavedra1 
Columbia Law School 
April 7, 2020 
 
Abstract 
Policymakers presently minimize the role of bankruptcy law in mitigating the 
financial fallout from COVID-19. Scholars too are unsure about the merits of 
bankruptcy, especially Chapter 11, in resolving business distress. We argue 
that Chapter 11 complements current stimulus policies for large corporations, 
such as airlines, and that Treasury should consider making it a precondition 
for receiving government-backed financing, particularly when the corporation 
was highly leveraged prior to the crisis. For these borrowers, Chapter 11 offers 
a flexible, speedy, and crisis-tested tool for preserving businesses and 
restructuring liabilities, permitting them to shed drags on their innovation, 
while ensuring that the costs of those improvements are borne primarily by 
investors, not taxpayers. For consumers and small businesses, however, 
bankruptcy should serve as a backstop to other policies, such as the CARES 
Act. Consumer bankruptcy law’s primary goal is to discharge debts, but that’s 
not what most consumers need right now. What they need is bridge financing 
and forbearance until the crisis ends and they get back to work. These key 
policy levers—bridge financing and forbearance—are available in theory to 
small businesses in Chapter 11 as well. The practical reality, however, is that 
bankruptcy is unattractive to many owner-managers who are essential to the 
business, but may have their ownership interests wiped out in bankruptcy. 
Even putting that issue aside, our bankruptcy courts likely lack the capacity to 
serve a deluge of small business bankruptcy cases. Although we believe that 
bankruptcy should serve as a backstop during the current crisis, this backstop 
may be used heavily in the months ahead. We therefore encourage 
policymakers to ensure adequate funding for our courts, which may need a 
greater number of judges and trustees.  
 
 
1 We thank Ken Ayotte, Douglas Baird, Vince Buccola, Tony Casey, Jared Ellias, 
Katharina Pistor, David Skeel, and Kate Waldock for helpful comments. 
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1. Introduction 
Social distancing guidelines have shut down large sectors of the 
American economy.2 Many U.S. households and businesses are now 
experiencing a sudden decline in income and, with it, a mounting inability to 
pay debts. This is a problem that bankruptcy law can address. For households, 
bankruptcy is a pathway to eliminate financial stress: the law can halt 
collection efforts and reduce or discharge debts in exchange for assets or future 
income. For businesses, bankruptcy resets the bargaining table with creditors: 
Companies are given time to renegotiate debts, renovate operations, 
renegotiate contracts, and propose a repayment plan consistent with their 
ability to pay. This typically involves wiping out the rights of old shareholders 
and converting old debt into new equity. Through these procedures, debtors 
receive a “fresh start” and the economy is, presumptively, better off. 
 
These solutions are time tested. When the financial crisis of 2008 
threatened some of the largest U.S. industrial corporations, including General 
Motors and Chrysler, bankruptcy was the solution.3 When industry-wide 
distress destabilized the airline industry during the early 2000s, bankruptcy 
was the solution for Delta, United, Northwest, and U.S. Air, among others.  
 
Should policymakers rely on our bankruptcy laws to help mitigate the 
financial stress suffered by consumers, small businesses, and large 
corporations today?4 We offer two answers: Bankruptcy should be a central 
part of policies targeting large corporations, but should be used only as a 
backup to other policies for consumers and small businesses.  
 
 
2 See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Trump Extends Social Distancing Guidelines through End of 
April, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 29, 2020 (available here). 
3 And the federal government assisted these businesses through the bankruptcy 
process, as discussed later in this essay. 
4 Our essay is related to the work of Ken Ayotte and David Skeel, who analyzed the 
pros and cons of bankruptcy versus bailouts for financial institutions during the 2008 
financial crisis. Kenneth Ayotte and David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. 
Corp. Law. 469 (2010). 
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Before explaining these punchlines, we provide an overview of how 
bankruptcy works. 
 
2. How It Works: Consumer and Corporate Bankruptcy 
Three “chapters” of the U.S. bankruptcy law provide the primary 
avenues of relief for distressed consumers and businesses:  
● Chapter 7 (a liquidation proceeding available to both 
individuals and businesses);5  
● Chapter 11 (a restructuring proceeding used primarily by 
corporations);6 and  
● Chapter 13 (a repayment plan available to individuals with 
regular income).7  
 
A bankruptcy petition triggers an “automatic stay,” halting collection 
efforts by all creditors anywhere in the world.8 For individuals, the automatic 
stay gives the debtor time to assess his or her situation, negotiate with creditors 
(especially secured creditors), and either liquidate assets (Chapter 7) or 
propose a plan of repayment (Chapter 13). For businesses in Chapter 11, the 
stay affords time to assess firm value, determine claim amounts, restructure 
operations or contracts or leases, and propose a plan of reorganization. 
 
The automatic stay may be the most important benefit of a bankruptcy 
filing, especially during the COVID-19 crisis, because it prevents most 
creditors from collecting or liquidating their debts. During a crisis that is 
 
5 11 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. 
6 §§ 1101 et seq. 
7 §§ 1301 et seq. 
8 § 362. There are important exemptions to the automatic stay. One permits the 
counterparties to swaps, repos, and other financial contracts to terminate the contracts 
and seize collateral. See generally Edward R. Morrison, Mark, J. Roe, and Christopher 
S. Sontchi, Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors, 69 Bus. Lawyer 1015 (2014). This exception 
was critically important during the previous crisis, which began in the banking sector 
where many financial contracts loom large, but will likely play a less significant role 
in this current crisis because, presently, bank insolvency is not a precipitating factor. 
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expected to be temporary, this “pause button” may be all that many debtors 
and businesses need. Equally important, it is a benefit that debtors obtain 
simply by filing a bankruptcy petition; no judicial action is needed.  
  
For consumers, Chapters 7 and 13 offer different kinds of trade-offs. 
Both discharge virtually all of the consumer’s debts, but at different costs. In 
Chapter 7, the consumer must relinquish assets that exceed what state or 
federal law says the consumer absolutely needs for his or her fresh start. She 
will also lose some assets, such as a home or car, if these are subject to 
mortgages or liens. The process is speedy: For the honest debtor who discloses 
all assets to the court, it can be completed within a matter of weeks.  
 
For consumers who want to retain assets that would be lost in Chapter 
7, the better option is Chapter 13. Instead of giving up assets, the consumer 
gives up “disposable income” for a period of three to five years.9 Every month, 
the consumer pays off secured creditors and, if any income remains after 
covering living expenses, pays the remainder to unsecured creditors.10 This 
isn’t easy. Legal fees are substantially higher in Chapter 13 as compared to 
Chapter 7.11 Worse, roughly two-thirds of consumers are unable to make the 
payments required by Chapter 13.12 Their cases are dismissed or converted to 
Chapter 7.  
 
For businesses, the choice between Chapters 7 and 11 is more 
straightforward. Chapter 7 is a funeral; Chapter 11 is a shot at renewal. 
Specifically, Chapter 7 turns the business over to a trustee, who is charged with 
liquidating its assets and distributing proceeds to creditors. Chapter 11 leaves 
the business in the hands of management, which is given an opportunity to 
 
9 § 1325(b)(2). See also Official Form 122C-2, available here. 
10 § 1326.  
11 See, e.g., Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter, and Deborah Thorne, 
“No Money Down” Bankruptcy, 90 S. Cal. L. Rev 1055 (2016). 
12 See, e.g., Edward R. Morrison and Antoine Uettwiller, Consumer Bankruptcy 
Pathologies, 173 J. Instit. & Theoret. Econ. 174 (2017), and sources cited therein. 
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obtain new, senior financing13 and propose a reorganization plan that values 
the going concern firm, reduces debts to a level consistent with the firm’s 
ability to pay, and implements essential operational changes (e.g,, 
renegotiating labor contracts). Creditors vote on the proposed plan. If the court 
approves the plan, the reorganized firm exits bankruptcy with a new capital 
structure: Old debts are eliminated and replaced with new debts owed by the 
newly reorganized firm; old shares are deleted and replaced with new shares 
issued by the reorganized firm. One fundamental rule looms in the 
background as management crafts a plan: Senior creditors must be paid before 
junior creditors, who must be paid before shareholders receive anything. This 
is the “absolute priority rule,” which generally means that shareholders are 
wiped out in Chapter 11 reorganizations.14 Junior debt may be wiped out too. 
The only creditors who retain rights after the firm is reorganized are those 
whose claims are (a) most senior and (b) collectively consistent with the firm’s 
ability to pay. Among these creditors, equity in the reorganized firm is 
typically transferred to the most junior creditors. 
 
The Chapter 11 process was designed with large corporations in mind 
(indeed, it is modeled on old rules for restructuring railroads) and, during the 
past forty years, the process has become user-friendly for these businesses. 
Large corporate Chapter 11 cases tend to be speedy because, among other 
things, most of the businesses have professional support and the foresight to 
negotiate with creditors before a bankruptcy filing, thereby clearing the way 
for a less controversial, or even pre-approved, reorganization plan (these are 
called “prenegotiated” and “prepackaged” cases). Frequently, this negotiation 
will not only clear away creditor objections, but will also involve the debtor’s 
commitment to sell the firm quickly after the bankruptcy filing.15 Proceeds 
 
13 The liquidity-enhancing role of Chapter 11 is the focus of Kenneth Ayotte and David 
A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Law as Liquidity Provider, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1557 (2013). 
14 See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Vedran Capkun, and Lawrence A. Weiss, Value Destruction 
in the New Era of Chapter 11, 29 J. L., Econ. & Org. 461 (2013). 
15 See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby and Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price 
of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 Yale L. J. 862 (2014); Douglas G. Baird and 
Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan L Rev 751, 777–88 (2002). 
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from the sale will then be distributed to creditors in order of lien rights and 
payment priority. 
 
Some of the largest U.S. corporations have used Chapter 11 to remedy 
distress and emerge financially healthier. These corporations include airlines 
(such as United and Delta), car manufacturers (General Motors and Chrysler), 
financial institutions (CIT Group), and oil companies (Texaco). Other major 
corporations have used Chapter 11 as a quick way to merge themselves with 
other corporations via a 363 sale. A good example is American Airlines. It 
acquired TWA through a 363 sale. Subsequently, during its own Chapter 11 
case, American merged with U.S. Airways. 
 
Chapter 11 works well in crises too. General Motors and Chrysler 
provide good illustrations. Both neared death during the 2008 financial crisis, 
but were taken into Chapter 11, where each received financial support from 
the federal government.16 Each was sold off to a buyer within weeks.17 The 
speedy bankruptcies, financed by the federal government, allowed both 
companies to renegotiate or shed legacy liabilities that had been a drag on 
innovation for decades. In the process, the U.S. government was also able to, 
in essence, rescue the supply-side chain of these auto giants, thereby 
preserving jobs up and down the entire auto industry. Whatever the federal 
government decides to do now for the aerospace or airlines industries, this is 
recent precedent that government-supported restructurings can help stabilize 
the American economy – and prove a good investment for taxpayer funds.  
 
This is not to say that Chapter 11 is perfect. It can generate important 
disruptions in operations as investors jockey for recoveries. One study, for 
example, finds that workers suffer long-term declines in wages when their 
 
16 Many other businesses also used Chapter 11 successfully during the crisis, but 
received no government support, including Lear Corp. and Visteon Corp. in the auto 
parts industry and Tronox Inc. in the chemicals industry. 
17 See Anthony J. Casey and Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, 91 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 479 (2015). 
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firms enter bankruptcy.18 Additionally, scholars have shown that the dynamics 
of a Chapter 11 case, including its duration, costs, and ultimate outcome, 
depend on contestable and hard-to-predict judicial decisions about creditor 
priority and firm value.19 Finally, scholarship has shown that secured creditors 
have outsized influence over the process. This is because the firm’s pre-
bankruptcy secured creditors are typically the same financiers (and usually the 
only available financiers) of the bankrupt business. This gives them outsized 
influence, which can lead to quick sales at “fire sale” prices instead of 
reorganization.20  
 
Although these downsides of Chapter 11 are important, we think they 
can be managed during the current crisis. Workers suffer large declines in 
wages when their firms become unprofitable, regardless of whether the firms 
file for bankruptcy. Although a filing can exacerbate this wage decline in 
normal times, it’s unclear whether to expect the same effect during this crisis, 
especially if the government is the primary supplier of liquidity to the 
bankrupt firm and uses that power as leverage to influence payroll (as it is 
currently doing under the CARES Act). The risk of “fire sales” in the current 
environment depends on the influence exerted by secured lenders. If they too 
are stressed, the lenders may prefer quick cash from fire sales instead of illiquid 
(but higher valued) claims against the reorganized firm. The risk of fire sales, 
therefore, depends critically on the extent to which government policy 
(through action by the Federal Reserve) mitigates financial stress in the 
financial sector. Additionally, if a stressed banking sector is unwilling to 
finance firms in Chapter 11, the government can play an essential role in 
 
18 The same authors find that workers receive wage premiums at firms with high 
bankruptcy risk. John R. Graham, Hyunseob Kim, Si Li, and Jiaping Qiu, “Employee 
Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy,” working paper (available here). 
19 See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey and Julia Simon-Kerr, A Simple Theory of Complex Valuation, 
113 Mich. L. Rev. 1175 (2015); Douglas G. Baird and Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute 
Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 Yale L. J. 1930 (2006). 
20 See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte and Jared A. Ellias, “Bankruptcy Process for Sale,” working 
paper (2020); Kenneth M. Ayotte and Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict 
in Chapter 11, 2 J. LEGAL ANAL. 511 (2009). 
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providing that financing and, at the same time, prevent unnecessary fire sales 
and preserve jobs.  
 
 A more fundamental weakness of Chapter 11 is that offers a poor fit for 
many small businesses. Thirty percent of firm value can be burned up by 
professional fees.21 Additionally, around two-thirds of all small-business 
Chapter 11s terminate in liquidation or dismissal (which leads to liquidation 
under state law).22 These outcomes are due, in part, to the fact that most small 
businesses do not undergo regular audits and have few or no human resources 
dedicated to financial management.23 Thus, when they enter Chapter 11, their 
financial affairs are difficult to unscramble. As a result, the vast majority never 
file a bankruptcy petition; they simply close shop.24 This is one reason why we 
are skeptical that bankruptcy is an appropriate remedy for small businesses 
during the current crisis.  
 
Congress has taken steps to mitigate the weaknesses in Chapter 11 for 
small businesses. Last summer, it passed the “Small Business Reorganization 
Act of 2019,”25 which went online on February 19, 2020. The Act’s central 
feature is that it eliminates part of the absolute priority rule in bankruptcy. This 
is important because many businesses are organized around the skills of the 
owner-manager. Without her, there is no business. An absolute priority rule 
that wipes out the owner-manager is a rule that strongly discourages her from 
helping the business navigate its way through bankruptcy. Under the new law, 
 
21 Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch, and Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy, 61 J. Fin. 1253 (2006). 
22 Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge 
to the Critics, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 603 (2009); Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, 
Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcy, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 2310 (2005) 
(“Serial Entrepreneurs”); Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making: An 
Empirical Study of Continuation Bias in Small Business Bankruptcies, 50 J. L. & Econ. 381 
(2007) (“Bankruptcy Decision Making”). 
23 Baird and Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs, supra; Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision 
Making, supra. 
24 Edward R. Morrison, Bargaining around Bankruptcy: Small Business Distress and State 
Law, 38 J. Legal Stud. 255 (2009). 
25 It is now Subchapter V of Chapter 11. 
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by contrast, a small business owner can retain her equity interest even if 
unsecured creditors will not be paid in full, as long as the Chapter 11 plan 
commits all of the business’s “disposable income” to these creditors for a three 
to five-year period. This abrogation of the absolute priority rule makes Chapter 
11 substantially more attractive to small businesses for two reasons: first, a 
business owner will no longer be deterred for fear of losing ownership. Second, 
by retaining her interest, she has a stronger incentive to help the firm revive 
itself, including paying off its remaining debts. 
 
The trouble with the new law is its limited scope. Originally it applied 
only to businesses with debt under about $2.7 million; the CARES Act raised 
the debt limit to $7.5 million. Even at that limit, however, scholars estimate that 
only 59 percent of all Chapter 11 cases would qualify,26 and the vast majority 
of cases are filed by small businesses. Moreover, the Act has some 
administrative challenges: It appoints a “standing trustee” to monitor the 
debtor’s progress in proposing and completing the multi-year plan of 
reorganization. The trustee may help identify nonviable businesses early on 
(seeking their dismissal or conversion to Chapter 7), and help viable businesses 
craft a feasible plan. It is unclear whether there are adequate standing trustees 
to assist with the potential increase in post-COVID-19 filings by small 
businesses. What we do know, however, is that neither these trustees nor the 
bankruptcy courts have substantial experience in administering these cases.  
 
3. The Limits of Bankruptcy Law During a Crisis 
The weaknesses of bankruptcy law fall into three categories. First is the 
take-up problem. Those who could benefit from bankruptcy may avoid it 
because of its costs. This is a big problem in normal times and could exacerbate 
the current crisis. For consumers, there has long been a perceived stigma 
associated with a filing. Additionally, a bankruptcy filing is a “flag” on credit 
reports for many years. As a result, studies have shown that only a fraction of 
 
26 Robert Lawless, “The Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 and COVID-19,” 
Credit Slips blog post (available here). 
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consumers who could benefit from bankruptcy actually petition for 
bankruptcy protection.27  
 
The take-up problem looms large for businesses too because 
shareholders’ rights take a backseat to creditor demands, particularly if the 
business is insolvent or undercapitalized. Owners and shareholders of any size 
business are likely to resist a process that wipes out their rights, especially if 
they think the business could possibly recover in the near term. Indeed, 
because shareholders are typically wiped out in bankruptcy, a corporation’s 
directors may delay filing in an effort to preserve share value.  
 
A second weakness is liquidity: For consumers, the “fresh start” of 
bankruptcy is a discharge of old debts, not access to cash necessary to pay 
expenses when income has fallen during a crisis. Indeed, for many consumers, 
a discharge of debts is the wrong prescription for their stress:28 After the crisis 
ends and they get back to work, they will be able to pay their debts. What they 
need is financial assistance and perhaps forbearance with respect to debts that 
are coming due now. For businesses, too, liquidity is a key problem: Their 
ability to survive depends critically on access to loans (or cash collateral) that 
allow the firm to make payroll, pay rent, purchase inputs, etc. The current crisis 
may make banks reluctant to extend credit. To the extent that the crisis harms 
the financial condition of banks themselves, moreover, we may find that cash-
strapped banks are not only reluctant to lend, but also aggressively seek 
liquidation of firms in bankruptcy. We saw this during the previous crisis.29 
 
 
27 See, e.g., Michelle J. White, Why Don't More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J. L. 
Econ. & Org. 205 (1998). 
28 Both consumers and creditors are harmed by an unnecessary bankruptcy 
discharge: Consumers become ineligible to obtain another discharge for many years 
(8 years must pass between Chapter 7 discharges); creditors receive only a fraction of 
what they are owed in the typical consumer bankruptcy. 
29 Sarah Pei Woo, Regulatory Bankruptcy: How Bank Regulation Causes Fire Sales, 99 Geo. 
L.J. 1615 (2011); Sarah Pei Woo, Simultaneous Distress of Residential Developers and Their 
Secured Lenders: An Analysis of Bankruptcy and Bank Regulation, 15 Fordham J. Corp. & 
Fin. L. 617 (2010).  
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A third weakness is the limited capacity of our bankruptcy courts. The 
bankruptcy process is a bargaining environment, overseen by a judge, where 
creditors and shareholders jockey for payoffs as they decide the fate of the firm. 
Judges are called on to make critical decisions, under extreme time pressure, 
based on potentially-biased and highly-contested information supplied by the 
parties. This is true in normal economic times. The burden on the judicial 
system will be extreme curing a crisis that brings an unprecedented flood of 
cases into the courts. We know, for example, that judges change their behavior 
when caseloads spike: A sudden increase in caseloads makes courts more 
likely to liquidate small firms, reorganize big firms (but take longer to do so), 
and terminate cases of firms that end up filing for bankruptcy again.30 If these 
decisions by time-strapped judges are errors, we should worry about the errors 
that may occur when courts are inundated by filings. 
 
These weaknesses—take-up, liquidity, and system capacity—mean that 
bankruptcy law cannot serve as a primary policy response for the stress faced 
by consumers and small businesses today. For consumers, bankruptcy doesn’t 
provide the essential remedies that they need right now: liquidity and 
forbearance. For small businesses, it may be possible to tap liquidity from 
government-backed lenders in bankruptcy, but the flood of cases would 
overwhelm the bankruptcy courts. Equally important, the prototypical small 
business is run by an owner-manager whose participation is essential to the 
business survival. Unless the absolute priority rule is modified for small 
businesses generally (currently it is modified only for businesses with debt 
under $7.5 million), small business owners may prefer to liquidate their 
businesses outside of bankruptcy than lose their ownership interests in 
bankruptcy.  
 
For these reasons, we think non-bankruptcy policies, especially those 
extending liquidity and forbearance, are the optimal response to the distress of 
 
30 Benjamin Iverson, Get in Line: Chapter 11 Restructuring in Crowded Bankruptcy Courts, 
64 Mgmt. Science 5370 (2018). 
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consumers and small businesses.31 Specifically, we recommend that Congress 
enact policies that create an automatic stay for the benefit of consumers and 
small businesses. Congress did this for members of the military through the 
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 2003. It is time to do it again, but for 
consumers and small businesses generally. Many may still file for bankruptcy, 
especially if government policies are inadequate. For them, bankruptcy can 
serve as a relief-valve, provided the government takes steps immediately to 
expand the capacity of our judicial system. 
 
We are more optimistic about the role of bankruptcy law in resolving 
the distress of large corporations. The crisis has destabilized all businesses, but 
many were likely to suffer distress regardless of a pandemic. The past decade 
saw a dramatic increase in corporate debt, especially leveraged loans, that 
allowed financially distressed “zombie companies” to survive without filing 
for bankruptcy by repeatedly refinancing their debts. By some estimates, 
zombies account for sixteen percent of publicly traded U.S. firms.32 By end of 
2019, a large proportion of even investment grade debt was vulnerable to a 
ratings downgrade.33 These statistics imply that a substantial proportion of 
stressed businesses today merit financial restructuring (or even liquidation) in 
bankruptcy instead of, or in addition to, financial aid from the federal 
government, such as the CARES Act.34 It would, in our view, be a mistake to 
extend further financing without requiring a simultaneous bankruptcy filing: 
 
31 The National Bankruptcy Conference (NBC) has made the same recommendation 
in a recent letter to Congress (available here). (Disclosure: Morrison is a member of 
the NBC.) 
32 See “International banking and financial market developments,” BIS Quarterly 
Review (September 2017). See also Ryan Bannerjee and Boris Hoffman, Zombie Firms: 
Causes and Consequences, BIS Quarterly Review (September 2018). 
33 See, e.g., Edward I. Altman, “The Credit Cycle Before And After The Market’s 
Awareness Of The Coronavirus Crisis In The U.S.,” working paper (April 2, 2020). 
34 See Sec. 1105, Senate Bill No. 3548, 116th Congress (Proposed March 19, 2020), 
available here, and H.R. 748, 116th Congress (signed into law March 27, 2020), 
available here. 
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The financing would allow these firms to use public funds to further delay a 
necessary restructuring.35 
 
The government should therefore treat Chapter 11 as a tool that works 
in tandem with other policies to mitigate financial stress in the corporate sector, 
particularly for large corporations that were approaching distress prior to 
COVID-19. For those businesses that need restructuring, the government can 
still provide liquidity, but in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding that 
enables financial restructuring, facilitates operational changes necessary to 
cope with a post-COVID-19 world,36 and forces investors to should the costs of 
distress that was exacerbated by excess leverage. 
 
Although a large number of big corporate cases would tax our 
bankruptcy courts, these cases come with professionals (lawyers, accountants, 
investment bankers) who reduce some of the burden on the courts.37 More 
importantly, the speed of a bankruptcy case is largely dictated by the 
institution providing the liquidity. Cash is king. The government, therefore, 
could play an important role in preventing unnecessary asset fires sales and 
 
35 Our point extends beyond corporations that took on excess leverage. It applies as 
well to companies that, prior to the crisis, were experiencing operational problems or 
facing large liability for past errors. Chapter 11 is an appropriate venue for resolving 
these problems while also receiving government financial assistance. Absent a 
Chapter 11 filing, government financial assistance will be doing double-duty: (i) 
mitigating the liquidity shock arising from the COVID-19 crisis and (ii) funding the 
firm’s efforts to resolve pre-crisis mistakes.  
36 For example, bankruptcy law gives the firm special powers (unavailable outside of 
bankruptcy) to renegotiate contracts and labor agreements and jettison assets that are 
incompatible with expected changes in the economic environment. 
37 Costs might also be mitigated if cases are filed in bankruptcy courts with substantial 
accumulated expertise with corporate distress, such as Delaware and the Southern 
District of New York. Though controversial, “forum shopping” by corporations has 
resulted in a large flow of complex corporate bankruptcies to these courts, allowing 
them to develop expertise that’s needed in a crisis. General Motors, for example, is a 
Detroit corporation that filed for bankruptcy in New York during the 2008 financial 
crisis. See Jared A. Ellias, What Drives Bankruptcy Forum Shopping? Evidence from Market 
Data, 47 J. Legal Stud. 119 (2018). 
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pushing the process toward a reorganization that preserves viable firms (and 
American jobs). This is precisely what we saw in the Chrysler and GM cases. 
Nonetheless, even if the administrative costs of Chapter 11 would not be low, 
we think they are offset by an important benefit of a bankruptcy process that 
permits government-assistance, but forces investors to shoulder the costs of 
the firm’s distress.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Federal, state, and local governments are already implementing 
policies, including financial assistance and forbearance, that will help stabilize 
household and business finances and limit the need for bankruptcy filings. 
Nonetheless, bankruptcy undoubtedly has an important role to play in the 
fallout from the COVID-19 crisis. Many consumers and businesses will file for 
bankruptcy when their inability to pay debts results in default or otherwise 
triggers creditor debt collection efforts, such as foreclosure.  
 
Accordingly, it is important for lawmakers to consider how best to 
prepare the landscape for this new, and likely historic, wave of distress.  For 
large corporations, Chapter 11 should be openly and seriously considered as 
an optimizing tool to prevent firm liquidation and equally protect the public 
fisc, particularly for businesses that require more than short-term liquidity to 
survive post-COVID-19. In fact, Chapter 11 may even pave the way for 
industry consolidation or other innovations to operations. While shareholders 
may lose their investments, businesses and jobs will be preserved.  
 
Similarly, for consumers and small businesses, while bankruptcy is not 
as immediately helpful as forbearance or direct income supplements, it will 
certainly be utilized if this short-term liquidity crisis becomes long term.38  For 
this reason, we believe it’s equally important for lawmakers to expand the 
 
38 Indeed, the CARES Act has taken steps to make the bankruptcy code more 
attractive to distressed consumers. The Act amends the code to exclude emergency 
payments to individuals from the code’s income eligibility thresholds. The Act also 
permits existing Chapter 13 debtors to request plan modifications based on changes 
in income due to COVID-19.  See CARES Act, § 1113. 
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capacity of the courts to administer this influx of cases, particularly if 
lawmakers want to see small businesses take-up the benefits of SBRA. 
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